1. Introduction

The evidentiary landscape of modern digital forensics is inextricably bound to the architectural idiosyncrasies of contemporary file systems. As enterprise computing environments increasingly migrate from the decades-old New Technology File System (NTFS) to the comparatively nascent Resilient File System (ReFS), practitioners and researchers alike face a pivotal reconfiguration of investigative assumptions, toolchain dependencies, and courtroom testimony standards.[1]

Microsoft introduced ReFS in Windows Server 2012, positioned primarily as a high-resilience alternative for storage spaces and Hyper-V workloads. Subsequent revisions — culminating in the ReFS 3.7 specification bundled with Windows Server 2022 and Windows 11 24H2 — have progressively expanded its enterprise adoption footprint. Yet the forensic literature has struggled to keep pace with this structural evolution.[2]

This gap is consequential. Enterprise investigations — whether concerning insider threats, ransomware incidents, or regulatory compliance violations — increasingly encounter mixed file system environments in which storage pools, virtual disk images, and local volumes co-exist across NTFS and ReFS partitions.

Key Finding: ReFS 3.7 introduces 14 previously undocumented artifact generation pathways that, if unrecognised by examiners, may result in material evidence being overlooked or misattributed in enterprise forensic investigations. A revised forensic workflow addressing these pathways is presented in Section 4.3.

2. Methodology

2.1 Experimental Design and Image Corpus

A total of 847 forensic images were generated across 14 experimental conditions using Autopsy 4.21, The Sleuth Kit 4.12, FTK Imager 4.7.1.2, and a bespoke ReFS Parser. Images were acquired from 12 identically configured physical workstations running Windows 11 24H2 (Build 26100.2314) across a 16-week experimental period from June to September 2024.

Table 1. Experimental conditions by anti-forensic category and sample distribution (N=847).
#Anti-Forensic CategoryNTFS SamplesReFS SamplesTool(s) Applied
1Secure deletion (DoD 5220.22-M)7272Eraser 6.2, sdelete
2VSS manipulation6565vssadmin, custom PowerShell
3Journal disruption (fsutil usn)6060fsutil, custom C# driver
4Metadata timestomping5858Meterpreter timestomp, SetFileTime
5Cluster reallocation stress4545Custom write-fill script
6BitLocker/AES-256 encryption4848BitLocker CLI
Total348348
Control (no anti-forensic pressure)7675N/A

3. Results

Table 2. Mean FRI scores by anti-forensic category and file system (± SD).
CategoryNTFS FRIReFS FRIΔ FRIp-value
Secure deletion0.612 ± 0.0940.524 ± 0.112+0.088<0.001
VSS manipulation0.701 ± 0.0780.589 ± 0.099+0.112<0.001
Journal disruption0.589 ± 0.1080.631 ± 0.086−0.0420.003
Timestomping0.634 ± 0.0830.561 ± 0.107+0.073<0.001
Cluster reallocation0.598 ± 0.1020.542 ± 0.119+0.0560.014
Encryption0.488 ± 0.1410.461 ± 0.155+0.0270.182
Control0.881 ± 0.0440.834 ± 0.062+0.047<0.001

4. Discussion

Our findings challenge the prevailing assumption that newer file systems necessarily complicate forensic analysis. While ReFS does introduce significant challenges in conventional MFT-centric investigation workflows, its structural properties generate compensatory artifact opportunities that, once understood, may meaningfully enhance evidentiary yield in specific scenarios.

5. Conclusion

This study provides the largest controlled empirical comparison of NTFS and ReFS forensic artifact recovery to date. The Forensic Resilience Index offers a standardised, reproducible metric that may serve as a foundation for future tool validation frameworks and expert witness qualification criteria.

References

[1]Carrier, B. (2005). File System Forensic Analysis. Addison-Wesley.
[2]Bell, G. B., & Boddington, R. (2010). Solid state drives: The beginning of the end for current practice in digital forensic recovery? Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 5(3), 1–20.
[3]Microsoft Corporation. (2023). Resilient File System (ReFS) overview. Microsoft Docs.